IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NIGERIA
IN THE ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION
HODEN AT ABUJA
ON FRIDAY, THE 17TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2021
BEFORE THEIR LORDSHIPS:
RAPHAEL CHIKWE AGBO JUSTICE, COURT OF APPEAL
MUHAMMAD IBRAHIM SIRAJO JUSTICE, COURT OF APPEAL
ABDUL-AZEEZ WAZIRI JUSTICE, COURT OF APPEAL
APPEAL NO. CA/A/99/2018
BETWEEN:
DIVISION KOGI STATE
AND
PHARM. ALIYU ZAKARI JIYA
JUDGMENT
(DELIVERED BY MUHAMMAD IBRAHIM SIRAJO, JCA)
Before the Federal High Court, Lokoja, presided over by Ekwo J, the Respondent as Plaintiff, claimed against the Appellants as Defendants, the sum of Thirteen Million Five Hundred Thousand Naira only (N13,500,000.00) as special damages being the value of his Jeep; One Million Five Hundred Thousand naira (N1,500,000) for loss of use of the Jeep and rentage from August - 31st October, 2011 as well as damages limited to Twenty Million Naira (N20,000,000.00) only.
The facts of the case as disclosed at the trial Court shows that while the Plaintiff was driving his Volkswagen Touareg Jeep with registration number FQ 922 ABC on 03/08/2011 at Opulega, along Ankpa - Ayingba highway, the 1st Defendant, now 1st Appellant who was driving a Police Van with registration number NPF 640C and marked “ANTI CRIME PATROL ANKPA DIVISION” on high speed dangerously and recklessly collided with the Respondent’s Jeep driven by the Respondent at the lane of the Respondent, thereby damaging the Respondent's Jeep beyond repairs. The Appellants denied the claim and asserted that the accident occurred as a result of a pothole on the road which deflated/burst the front tyre of the Police Vehicle in question; and that the damaged parts of the Respondent's Vehicle are replaceable.
At the conclusion of trial, the learned trial Judge found for the Respondent and awarded him special damages in the sum of N13.5m being the value of this Jeep, the sum of N1.5m for hiring of vehicle for three months after the accident, as well as N2m general damages against the Appellants jointly and severally.
Dissatisfied with the decision of the trial Court delivered on 21/04/2017, the Appellants have now appealed to this Court vide a Notice of Appeal predicated on three grounds of appeal dated 19/06/2017 but filed on 20/06/107. The Appellants filed an Amended Notice of Appeal with five grounds in addition to the omnibus ground on 16/05/2018 and same was deemed as properly filed and served by an order of Court made on 22/05/2018.
The Grounds of Appeal contained in the Amended Notice of Appeal are reproduced hereunder:
“GROUND 1
The learned trial Judge erred in law when it assumed jurisdiction and entertained the suit of the respondent against the 2nd appellant who is not a juristic personality and same occasioned a miscarriage of justice.
PARTICULARS:
GROUND 2
The Learned trial judge erred in law when it assumed jurisdiction and entertain the suit of the respondent against the appellants who are Public Officers of the Federal Republic of Nigeria when the suit has become statute barred on 1st March, 2012 as the cause of action accrued on 3rd August, 2011.
PARTICULARS:
GROUND 3
The trial Court misdirected itself in law when it held at page 8 of its judgment as follows:
“...The police Report Exh. DW1-D does not help matters. An investigation conducted by PW3 who was a passenger in the police vehicle cannot be relied upon. The vehicle inspection officer’s report EXh. DW1-B contained nothing about the cause of the accident. There is no expert evidence save that of PW2 and Exh. PW 2-A...” which has occasioned a miscarriage of justice.
PARTICULARS OF MISDIRECTION:
GROUND 4
The trial Court misdirected itself in law when it held at page 18 of its judgment as follows:
“...The evidence of DW2, DW3 and DW4 that the vehicle had a tyre burst upon entering into a pot-hole thereby losing its tie-rod only strengthens the Plaintiff’s case on the speed of the 1st defendant”.
PARTICULARS OF MISDIRECTION:
“If a defendant denies negligence, he may give evidence of inevitable accident although he has not specifically pleaded it.”
GROUND 5
The learned trial Judge erred in law when he failed to properly evaluate the evidence before the lower Court.
PARTICULARS
“The trial Court has a legal duty to properly evaluate the evidence led on both sides before coming to a decision which decision must inevitably be based on the totality of the evidence thus properly appraised or evaluated. If it fails in this duty it commits an error of law. The aggrieved can then appeal on the ground of error in law giving as his particulars of error the failure to properly assess or evaluate or appraise the evidence led by and on his behalf.”
OMNIBUS GROUND
The judgment is against the weight of evidence and this has occassined a miscarriage of justice.
PARTICULARS
”
On 19th July, 2018, the Appellants filed their brief of Argument while the Respondent’s Brief of Argument was filed on 20th, September, 2018.
At the hearing of the appeal on 1st July, 2021 Appellants’ counsel, Abdulwahab Muhammad, SAN, Leading A.M Adoyi and E.N Ayua, adopted the Appellants’ brief and urged this Court to allow the appeal and set aside the Judgment of the lower Court.
Counsel for the Respondent, A.O Jonathan Esq in turn urges us to dismiss the appeal after adopting the Respondent's brief of argument.
The lone issue formulated for determination in the Appellants’ brief is as follows:
“Whether the Court below properly evaluated the evidence adduced by the parties before arriving at its decision. (Distilled from grounds 3,4 and 5 of the amended notice of appeal)”
The Appellants abandoned grounds one and two of the grounds of appeal by not formulating any issue or canvassing any argument from the said grounds. It is now firmly settled that where no issue is formulated or argument proffered in support of a ground of appeal, the said ground is deemed abandoned and liable to be struck out. It makes no difference whether or not an application to strike out the said ground is made. Accordingly, grounds one and two of the grounds of appeal, having been abandoned, are hereby struck out. See Usman Maigari vs. The State (2013) LPELR-20897(SC); Ekunola vs. Central Bank of Nigeria (2013) LPELR-20391(SC); Snig Nig. Ltd vs. Wema Bank (2016) LPELR-40576(CA); Charles Duru vs. FRN (2020) LPELR-50099 (CA); Ikumonihan vs. The State (2018) LPELR-44362(SC).
The Respondent's brief also adopted the sole issue raised by the Appellant.
Arguing the appeal in his brief, learned senior counsel for the Appellants, Abdulwahab Muhammed, urged this Court to hold that the trial Court did not properly evaluate the evidence adduced before entering judgment against the Appellants which resulted in miscarriage of justice against the Appellants in this appeal. His referred to the case of the Plaintiff/Respondent at the lower Court wherein he alleges dangerous and reckless driving by the 1st Appellant which led to the irreparable damage to his vehicle and submitted that the Plaintiff/Respondent has failed to adduce evidence of recklessness which he alleged. Learned senior counsel argued that the trial Court’s failure to appraise and evaluate exhibits DW1-C and DW1-D, that is, the legal Advice from Ministry of Justice Kogi State and the Police Investigation Report, has occasioned miscarriage of justice to the Appellants. He faulted the findings of the trial Judge where he held :-
“…The Police Report Exh. DW1-D does not help matters. An investigation conducted by PW3 who was a passenger in the Police Vehicle cannot be relied upon. The Vehicle inspection officer’s report, Exh. DW1-B contained nothing about the cause of the accident. There is no expert evidence save that of PW2 and EXh. IW2-A…”
and submitted that the inference drawn by the trial Court above is untenable in law. Muhammed, SAN argued that the fact that the Police investigation report was made by an officer who was a passenger in the Police Van at the time of the accident does not ipso facto make the said document unreliable as same was made by DW1 in his official capacity and therefore he does not fall within the ambit of “person interested”. He referred to the authority of Ladoja vs. Ajimobi (2016) LPELR-40658(SC). Learned senior counsel contended that if the learned trial Judge had properly evaluated Exh. DW1-D and even considered and evaluated Exh DW1-C, he would have arrived at a different concussion. It is further argued for the Appellants that the purpose of tendering Exhibits DW1-C and DW1-D was to prove the fact of the inevitability of the accident that occurred on 03/082011 which revealed that a pothole caused the tyre of the Appellants’ vehicle to burst leading to the removal of the tie-rod which cause the Appellants vehicle to divert from its own side of the read to the Respondent’s side.
The Court is referred on this submission, to the case of C & C Construction Company Ltd & Anor vs Okhai (2003) LPELR-821(SC).
It is the further argument of learned senior counsel that the lower Court shut its eyes on the evidence adduced by the Appellants to the effect that the damage caused the respondent’s Vehicle was not irreplaceable as the damaged parts are replaceable and fixable and that the engine and other parts of the Vehicle are unaffected by the accident, and opted to rely on the evidence of PW2 and exhibit PW2-A to the effect that the Respondent’s Vehicle was damaged beyond repairs. He also attacked the qualification of PW2 to testify as an expert as he did not produce the vocational certificate he claimed to have acquired. In this light, counsel faulted the trial Court’s reliance on the testimony of PW2. He placed reliance on All Nigeria Peoples Party vs. Usman (2008) 12 NWLR (Pt.1100)1.
This Court is urged to reevaluate the evidence adduced by the parties in order to arrive at a just determination of the case based on proper inferences to be drawn from the facts before the trial Courts. In support of this submission, the following cases are cited: Royal Ade Nig. Ltd & Anor vs. N.O.C.M CO. PLC (2004) 8 NWLR (pt. 874) 206; Tukur vs. UBA & Ors (2012) LPELR – 9337 (SC); International Bank Ltd vs Imano (Nig) Ltd (2000) II NWLR (pt.679) 62 6@637.
The Court is urged to hold that from the evidence before the trial Court the defence of inevitable accident avails the Appellants and that it is the duty of the Respondent to rebut same, on the authority of Abubakar & Anor vs Joseph & Anor (2008) 13 NWLR (PT.1104) 307. It is also argued that it is the duty of the Respondent to furnish the Court with sufficient materials in proof of negligence as the cause of the accident, which he fails to do. In conclusion, this Court is called upon to resolve the lone issue in favor of the Appellants by allowing this appeal and setting aside the Judgment of the lower Court.
Responding on the lone issue formulated by the Appellant and adopted by him, i.e., on the allegation that the trial Court did not property evaluate the evidence adduced before it, learned counsel for the Respondent, Ayo Jonathan Esq., submitted in his brief of argument that evaluation of evidence and ascription of probative value to it remains the exclusive preserve of the trial Court because of its single opportunity of hearing and watching the demeanour of witnesses and therefore it is best suited to assess their credibility. He submitted that unless there is a compelling reason, this Court will not intervene in matters relating to ascription of probative value to the evidence of witnesses. He relied on Tukur vs UBA (2012)7 SCNJ pt.p pg328; Governor of Lagos State vs. Adeyiga (2012) 2 SCNJ 1 @ 37 and BFI vs BPE (2012) 7 SCNJ pt.II pg 405 @ 431.
On the complaints of the Appellants that the Respondent’s vehicle is insured, counsel submitted that this piece of evidence is not relevant to the question of negligence, more so that there is no evidence that any Insurance Company has paid for the damage done by the Appellants to the Respondent’s vehicle.
On the alleged improper evaluation of exhibit DW1-D, the Police Investigation Report, counsel submitted that the said exhibit is an internal memo from the Divisional Police Officer, Ankpa to his Boss, the Commissioner of Police at Lokoja and that the Writer was not called for purposes of cross-examination. Mr Jonathan further faulted the probative value of exhibit DW1-D as it was the product of investigation conducted by one of the Policemen in the Police Van that collided with the Respondent's Vehicle. He urged the Court to hold that the challenge on the evaluation of evidence is frivolous.
On the Attorney General’s letter exonerating the driver of the Police van of any crime, Mr. Jonathan argued that the letter is of no value as the case before the trial Court was predicated on civil liability and that the Attorney General does not advise the Police on civil liabilities. He urged the Court to hold that the trial Court properly evaluated and ascribed probative value to the evidence before it in giving judgment to the Respondent.
On the evidence of PW2, it is submitted for the Respondent that the witness in not required by law to exhibit his certificate in order to qualify as an expert. That the Appellants who had a duty to challenge his competence failed to do so by calling an expert or evidence of inspection of the accidented vehicle. Further that Exhibits PW2-A, the Report of inspection by PW2 was admitted without objection. He urged the Court to dismiss the appeal and affirm the judgment of the lower Court.
RESOLUTION OF THE LONE ISSUE
This appeal is predicated on the subject of improper evaluation of evidence. The appellants are alleging that the trial Court did not properly evaluate the evidence adduced before it.
The word “evaluation” means appraisal, in terms of credibility, reliability and accuracy. It is the act of judging the worth or value of something or someone. It is the process of forming an opinion of the amount, value or quality of something after thinking about it. See Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary, 7th Edition. In relation to evidence or judicial proceedings, evaluation of evidence entails the appraisal of the entire evidence placed before the Judge with a view to ascertaining which side of the divide the pendulum tilts. It is the opinion formed by a Judge on the amount or volume, value or quality of evidence placed before him after a thoughtful consideration of same. The duty of evaluating evidence in a judicial proceeding squarely rests on the trial Judge, who has the singular privilege of seeing and watching the demeanour of witnesses who testified before him. In the discharge of his duty, the law enjoins the trial Judge to appraise the evidence led by the parties by ascribing probative value to them before arriving at his decision which must be based on the said appraisal. In Lagga vs. Sarhuna (2008) LPELR – 1740 (SC), the Supreme Court, per Muhammad, JSC (as he then was, now CJN) stated the law at page 23 of the Report, thus:
“Now in evaluating any piece of evidence placed before it by parties, a Court of law is duty bound to consider the totality of the evidence led by each of the parties. It shall then place it on the imaginary scale of justice to see which of the two sides weighs more creditably than the other. Thus, evaluating of evidence entails the assessment of same so as to give value or quality to it. Evaluation of evidence by a trial Court should necessarily involve a reasoned belief of the evidence of one of the contending parties and disbelief of the other or a reasoned preference of one version to the other.”
See Lafia Local Government vs The Executive Government Nasarawa State & Ors (2012) LPELR – 20602 (SC); Ayorinde & Ors vs Sogunro & Ors (2012) LPELR – 7808 @ pages 22-23; Ugwuani vs Okeke (2017) LPELR- 42735(CA); Buhari vs. INEC (2008) 19 NWLR (pt. 1120) 246.
The complaint of the Appellants in this appeal are three-fold:
For Purposes of clarity, exhibit DW1–D is the Police Investigation Report while exhibit DW1-C is the Legal advice on a case of serious road accident from the office of the Attorney General of Kogi State. The two exhibits were tendered in evidence by DW1, W/Sgt. Eleojo, together with exhibits DW1-A, the sketch map of the scene of accident and exhibit DW1-C, the Vehicle Inspection Officer’s Report.
I shall now deal with the said complaints seriatim.
Exhibit DW1-D is memo from the Divisional Police officer, Ankpa Division, DSP Indowu S. Taiwo to the Commissioner of Police “B” Ops Dept (SHQ), Lokoja. It is titled “Police Investigation Report on a case of serious motor accident” The accident report was made by the respondent in this appeal. The said exhibit DW1-D is a product of investigation conducted by PW3, Police Constable Adiku Edwin, who was one of the passengers in the Police Van that collided with the Respondent's vehicle. Exhibit DW1-C, on the other hand, is a Legal Advice from the Kogi State Ministry of Justice on the case of serious motor accident involving vehicles driven by the 1st Appellant and the Respondent in which the 1st Appellant was exonerated from criminal prosecution under section 23 of the Road Traffic Law.
Contrary to the submission of learned senior counsel for the Appellants, the learned trial Judge made specific findings with respect to these exhibits and stated his reasons for the said finding at pages 7-8 of the judgment, contained at pages 543-544 of the Record of Appeal, as follows:
“The 1st Defendant said that a pothole caused him a tyre burst and a pull out tie rod. this defence cannot avail the 1st defendant. Assuming there was a pothole a careful driver would apply his brakes and easily go over the pothole. The Legal Advice from the Ministry of Justice - EXH DW1-C is of no moment. This is more so that the 1st Defendant has since been dismissed on account of this accident. The Police Report, EXH. DW1-D does not help matters. An investigation conducted by PW3 who was a passenger in the Police Vehicle cannot be relied upon. The Vehicle Inspection Report-EXH. DW1-B contained nothing about the cause of the accident”.
The learned trial Judge has stated his reasons for refusing to rely on the said exhibit DW1-C. It is curious that a Police Constable would be assigned to investigate what the Police itself termed “A case of serious motor accident”. One would have expected that a more experienced officer, like an Inspector, a Sergeant or even a Corporal would have been assigned this serious task. But the Divisional Police Officer, Ankpa Division thought otherwise.
It is further curious that of all the Police Officers in Ankpa Division of the Nigerian Police none is deemed fit and proper to investigate the case other than a passenger in the same vehicle that caused the accident. I am satisfied that the reason giving by the learned trial Judge for not giving any weight to exhibit DW1-D is unassailable.
With respect to Exhibit DW1-C, the Legal Advice, the trial Count held it to be of no moment as the driver of the Police Van, the 1st Appellant, has since been dismissed by the Nigerian Police on account of this same accident. That legal Advice was predicated on a criminal case diary compiled by PW3, the Investigating Police Officer and a passenger in the Police Van driven by the accused person, PC Danladi Sunday, the 1st Appellant. The Legal Advice deals with criminal liability. Even the Nigerian Police did not heed to the advice otherwise the 1st Appellant would not have been dismissed. I agree with the submission of counsel for the Respondent that criminal liability is distinct from civil liability founded on tort.
This Court is urged to hold that the inference drawn by the trial Court on Exhibits DW1-C and DW1-D is untenable in law. It is settled law that the appellate Courts do not ordinarily interfere with the findings of fact and decisions made thereunder by a trial Court except in the following circumstances:
See Lagga vs. Sarhuna (2008) LPELR-1740 SC; Magaji vs. Odofin (1978) 4SC 91; Anyegwu vs Onuche (2009) 1SCNJ 91.
In the instinct appeal, the trial Judge cannot be said to have abdicated its duty of evaluating the evidence led. He did evaluate exhibits DW1-C and DW1-D and found that they do not in any way aid the Appellants’ case. Furthermore, the findings of the trial Court with respect to the said exhibits is not perverse in that it is neither speculative nor did it take into account extraneous matters.
On the evidence of PW2 and exhibit PW2 - A tendered by him, the witness called himself an expert and that exhibit PW2 – A, the Inspection Report of the Respondent's vehicle which he prepared is a product of his expertise as an automobile mechanic. He testified before the lower Court that as a result of the violent collision and the parts affected by the collision the Respondents’ Vehicle cannot be put back to any useful shape anymore as it is damaged beyond any economic repairs. In exhibit PW2 - A, PW2 listed the part/items that were damaged in the vehicle to include the Engine, Chassis, Transmission, suspension, wind screen, bonnet and its shock absorbers, Radiator, Condenser, Front Axle, Power Steering pump, Compressor, Font grill, Set of Engine and Gearbox sittings.
Now, section 68 of the Evidence Act, 2011, provides:
“(1) When the Court has to form an opinion upon a point of foreign law, customary law or custom, or of science or art, or as to identity of hand writing or finger impression, the opinions upon that point of persons especially skilled in such foreign law, customary law or custom, or science or art, or in questions as to identity of hand writing or finger impressions, are admissible.
(2) Persons so specially skilled as mentioned in subsection (1) of this section are called experts.”
From the above provisions, it is clear that for a person to qualify as an expert in the field of science or art, he must not of necessity present paper qualifications in the form of Certificates. Acquisition of skills through practice of a particular trade, vocation, or occupation over time can qualify a person as an expert in that field.
Even the definition of an expert by the Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th Ed, quoted by learned senior counsel for the Appellants is in tandem with what I have postulated above. The definition goes thus:
“A person who through education or experience has developed skill or knowledge in a particular subject so that he or she may form an opinion that will assist the fact finder.”
The emphasis here is on education or experience. Therefore, by the provision of section 68 (1) of the Evidence Act, 2011, when a Court has to from an opinion upon a point of science, which includes automobile engineering and repairs, the opinions upon that point of persons specially skilled in such science is admissible and such persons so specially skilled are called “experts”. The Supreme Court has held that a person who has special knowledge, training or experience in the matter in question or he has made a special study of the subject or acquired a special experience on the subject matter is an expert. See Azu vs The State (1993) LPELR - 689 (SC) @ page 11; Seismograph Services Ltd vs Onokpasa (1972) 4 SC 1110 @ 112. The implication of these decisions is that where a person has a special training in or made a special study of or acquired special experience in the matter in question is an expert on the matter. Possession of either special training or special study or acquisition of experience by a person will suffice to qualify that person as an expert on such matters.
Where a witness claims expertise in a particular matter or field, the opposing party owes a duty to thoroughly cross-examine the said witness with a view to rubbishing his claim to expertise on the matter or field of science or art. See ANPP vs. Usman (Supra), cited and relied upon by Muhammed, SAN. The appellants as defendants failed to attack the claim of PW2 that he is an expert mechanic. He was only asked about his vocational certificate which he said he did not come along with it to the Court. How he became an expert automobile mechanic and the length of his experience on the job that entitled him to the skills he claimed to possess are matters that the Appellants as Defendants ought to have attacked and discredit but they failed to do.
The PW2 was also not cross-examined on how he came by the conclusion that the Respondent’s Vehicle was damaged beyond repairs. Further to this, the Appellants as Defendants have ample opportunity to produce and tender another Inspection Report that will counter the Report tendered by PW2. Again, they failed to utilise that opportunity. The learned trial Judge’s treatment of the evidence of PW2 as the evidence of an expert and placing reliance on it, in view of the Appellant’s failure to lead evidence to the contrary, cannot be faulted.
On the submission of senior counsel for the Appellants that the lower Court failed to consider the defence of inevitable accident put up by the Appellants as Defendants, which defence, according to senior counsel, was proved by exhibits DW1-C and DW1-D, I wish to reiterate my earlier position that the reasons given by the trial Court in refusing to attach weight to these exhibits are sound in law for the reasons stated by me supra. Assuming however that the trial Court was wrong in according no weight to these two exhibits and other exhibits tendered by the Appellants, could the Appellants be said to have proved the defence of inevitable accident? Where a defendant sets up a defence of inevitable accident in a case of negligence it is his duty to establish the defence by credible evidence. Where he fails the defence will not avail him. This is the position of the law as espoused by the Supreme Court, per Edozie, JSC, in the case of C & C construction Company Ltd & Anor vs. Samuel Tunde Okhai (2003) LPELR-821(SC), a case cited and relied upon by Learned Senior Advocate for the Appellants. In that case, the Learned Law Lord stated at pages 30-31 of the Report thus:
“Strictly speaking, if a defendant denies negligence, he may give evidence of inevitable accident, although he has not specifically pleaded it, Per Devlin, J. in Southport Corporation vs. Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd (1956) AC 218 @ 231. The better practice, however, is for the defendant who intends to rely on inevitable accident as a defence to plead such defence specifically and to give all necessary particulars relied on. He should plead that the said accident or matters complained of arose from inevitable accident and notwithstanding the exercise of all reasonable care and skill on the defendant, he was unable to avoid same. This is followed by full particulars of the facts and matters relied on as constituting inevitable accident… Pleading inevitable accident is one thing but proof thereof is a different matter. The onus is on the party who raises that defence to lead evidence to substantiate same.” (Underlining mine, for emphasis).
It is the case of the Appellants as Defendants that the accident occurred as a result of a pothole on the road which burst the front tyre of the Police vehicle causing the vehicle to veer off from its lane to the lane of the Respondent resulting in a collision with the Respondent's vehicle. Apart from the mere ipse dixit of the occupants of the Police vehicle including the driver, who testified as DW2, DW3 and DW4 that the Police vehicle hit a pothole leading to a tyre burst which caused the subsequent collision with the Respondents vehicle, and exhibits DW1-C and DW1-D, the Legal Advice and the Police Investigation Report which are based on the said evidence of DW2, DW3 and DW4, there is no credible evidence in the form of a sketch map of the scene of accident to show that there was indeed a pothole, as the purported sketch map was not signed by the maker, rendering it a worthless document. No wonder then that even learned senior counsel for the Appellants said nothing about the sketch map in his brief of argument. Besides this, exhibit DW1-C, the Report of the Vehicle Inspection Officer, did not state that the accident occurred as a result of pothole and tyre burst. Rather, the Vehicle Inspection Officer concluded his report thus:
“Vehicle was inspected and found seriously damaged. Cause of accident not suggested.” (See page 531 of the Record of Appeal).
It is clear from the above that even if the lower Court had paid attention to exhibits DW1-C and DW1-D, they would not have aided the defence of the Appellants.
A Court of law does not act on speculation but on concrete evidence adduced before it by the parties. All the submissions of senior counsel for the Appellants on defence of inevitable accident are founded on speculation, not on credible evidence led before the trial Court. The most potent evidence that would have established the existence or presence of pothole as the cause of the accident would have been a sketch map of the scene of the accident together with the Report of the Vehicle Inspection Officer. Unfortunately, the sketch map tendered by the Appellants as Defendants was not signed by the maker, W/Sgt Eleojo, who testified as DW1, thereby rendering it worthless. The Vehicle Inspection Officer’s Report tendered as exhibit DW1-C on the other hand, did not disclose the cause of the accident as quoted earlier. The learned trial Judge was therefore right in rejecting the Appellants’ defence of inevitable accident for want of proof.
The law is settled that where a Court of trial has evaluated the evidence led before it and appraises the facts before arriving at its decision, it is not the business of the Court of Appeal to substitute its own view with that of the trial Court.
Having found that the trial Court has evaluated the evidence led by the parties before handing down its decision, I hereby resolve the lone issue in this appeal against the Appellants and in favour of the Respondent. Accordingly, I dismiss the appeal for being devoid of merit and affirm the Judgement of the learned trial Judge in Suit No. FHC/LKJ/CS/83/2011 delivered on 26th April, 2017. The Appellants shall pay the cost of N50,000.00 to the Respondent.
MUHAMMAD IBRAHIM SIRAJO
JUSTICE, COURT OF APPEAL
APPEARANCES:
